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This contribution consists of three parts. In section 1, which is a kind ofsummary of part I of From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism,1
I will characterize Hintikka’s quantitative theory of confirmation as one of
the four main theories. Moreover, I will disentangle the structural and
genuine inductive aspects in these theories of confirmation. In section 2 I
will  develop Hintikka’s ideas about two major types of information called
information and content.  In 1997 Hintikka wrote, “In hindsight, I regret2
that I did not develop further the ideas presented in Hintikka (1968).”  I will3
point out the close relation between transmitted information and content on
the one hand and confirmation on the other. Additionally, I will characterize
Hintikka’s aims and claims regarding the choice between hypotheses when
dealing with explanation and generalization in relation to (transmitted)
information and content. In section 3 I will first disentangle the structural
and genuine inductive aspects of prior and posterior probabilities and of
transmitted information and content, then I will discuss Hintikka’s answers
to the question of what to maximize in the service of explanation and
generalization, viz., maximizing information by maximizing likelihood and
maximizing (transmitted) content, respectively. I will suggest alternative
answers, viz., in terms of structural and inductive aspects, respectively. I
will conclude with some remarks about the choice of a probability function,
a problem that tends to remain hidden when dealing with the choice
between hypotheses on the basis of a fixed probability function underlying
a theory of confirmation.
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1. ORDERING THE LANDSCAPE OF CONFIRMATION
The aim of this section is to give a coherent survey of qualitative and
quantitative notions of confirmation, partly by synthesizing the work of
others, in a standard or nonstandard way, and partly by showing the
distance between this synthesis and the work of others. I will start with
qualitative, more specifically, deductive confirmation, of which the standard
form is supplemented with two comparative principles. Keeping deductive
confirmation as extreme partial explication in mind, I then turn to quantita-
tive, more specifically, probabilistic confirmation, and introduce the crucial
distinction between inductive and noninductive, or structural confirmation.
This will lead to a survey of the four main theories of confirmation for
universal hypotheses, viz., those of Popper, Carnap, Bayes, and Hintikka.
Finally, the section deals with the question of a general (quantitative)
degree of confirmation and its decomposition into degrees of structural and
inductive confirmation, leading to four kinds of inductive confirmation.
1.1. Types of Confirmation
1.1.1. Deductive Confirmation
Contrary to many critics, and partly in line with Gemes,  I believe that the4
notion of deductive (d-)confirmation makes perfectly good sense as partial
explication, provided the classificatory definition is supplemented with
some comparative principles. More specifically, “(contingent) evidence E
d-confirms (consistent) hypothesis H” is defined by the clause: H (logically)
entails E, and further obeys the following principles:
Comparative principles:
P1: if H entails E and E entails E* (and not vice versa) then E
d-confirms H more than E*.
P2: if H and H* both entail E then E d-confirms H and H* equally.
To be sure, this definition-with-comparative-supplement only makes sense
as a partial explication of the intuitive notion of confirmation; it leaves
room for nondeductive, in particular, probabilistic extensions, as we will see
below. However, let us first look more closely at the comparative principles.
They are very reasonable in light of the fact that the deductive definition
can be conceived as a (deductive) success definition of confirmation: if H
entails E, E clearly is a success of H, if not a predictive success, then at least
a kind of explanatory success. From this perspective, P1 says that a stronger
(deductive) success confirms a hypothesis more than a weaker one, and P2
says that two hypotheses should be equally praised for the same success. In
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particular P2 runs against standard conceptions. However, in chapter 2 of
From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism, I deal extensively with the
possible objections and show, moreover, that the present analysis can
handle the confirmation paradoxes discovered by Hempel and Goodman.
Deductive confirmation can also be supplemented with “conditional
deductive confirmation”: E d-confirms H, assuming a condition C, that is,
H & C entails E. This type of conditionalization, also applicable for non-
deductive confirmation, will not be treated further in this survey.
1.1.2. Probabilistic Confirmation
Probabilistic confirmation presupposes, by definition, a probability func-
tion, indicated by p, that is, a real-valued function obeying the standard
axioms of probability, which may nevertheless be of one kind or another
(see below). But first I will briefly deal with the general question of a
probabilistic criterion of confirmation. The standard (or forward) criterion
for probabilistic confirmation is that the posterior probability p(H | E)
exceeds the prior probability p(H) (relative to the background knowledge),
that is, p(H | E) > p(H). However, this criterion is rather inadequate for ‘p-
zero’ hypotheses. For example, if p(H) = 0 and E d-confirms H, this con-
firmation cannot be seen as an extreme case of probabilistic confirmation,
since p(H | E) = p(H) = 0. However, for p-nonzero hypotheses and assuming
0 < p(E) < 1, the standard criterion is equivalent to the backward or success
criterion, according to which the so-called likelihood p(E | H) exceeds the
initial probability p(E) of E: p(E | H) > p(E). Now it is easy to verify that
any probability function respects d-confirmation according to this criterion,
since p(E | H) = 1 when H entails E, and hence exceeds p(E), even if p(H)
= 0. More generally, the success criterion can apply in all p-zero cases in
which p(E | H) can nevertheless be meaningfully interpreted.
To be sure, as Maher stresses, the success criterion does not work
properly for ‘p-zero evidence’,  e.g., in the case of verification of a real-5
valued interval hypothesis by a specific value within that interval. However,
although this is less problematic,  it seems reasonable to accept the standard6
criterion for p-zero evidence. Note that this leads to the confirmation verdict
in the indicated case of verification. From now on “confirmation” will mean
forward or backward confirmation when p(H) ¹ 0 ¹ p(E), backward con-
firmation when p(H) = 0 and p(E) ¹ 0 and forward confirmation when p(E)
= 0 and p(H) ¹ 0; and it is left undefined when p(H) = 0 = p(E).
1.1.2.1. Structural Confirmation
I now turn to a discussion of the kinds of probability functions and corres-
ponding kinds of probabilistic confirmation. I start with non-inductive or
structural confirmation, which has an “objective” and a “logical” version.
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Consider first an objective example dealing with a fair die. Let E indicate
the even (elementary) outcomes 2, 4, 6, and H the “high” outcomes 4, 5, 6.
Then (the evidence of) an even outcome confirms the hypothesis of a high
outcome according to both criteria, since p(E | H) = p(H | E) = 2/3 > 1/2 =
p(H) = p(E).
I define structural confirmation as confirmation based on a probability
function assigning equal and constant probabilities to the elementary
outcomes. Such a probability function may either represent an objective
probability process, such as a fair die, or it may concern the so-called
logical probability or logical measure function, indicated by m (correspond-
ing to Carnap’s c -function).  Kemeny’s m-function assigns probabilities on+ 7
the basis of ([the limit, if it exists, of] the ratio of) the number of structures
making a statement true, that is, the number of models of the statement.8
These logical probabilities may or may not correspond to the objective
probabilities of an underlying process, as is the case of a fair die. Hence, for
structural confirmation, we may restrict the attention to generalizations of
Kemeny’s m-function.
Structural confirmation is a straightforward generalization of d-con-
firmation. For suppose that H entails E. Then 
m(E | H) = (lim) |Mod(E & H)| / |Mod(H)| = 
1 > (lim) |Mod(E)| / |Mod(Tautology)| = m(E), 
where e.g., ‘|Mod(H)|’ indicates the number of models of H. Hence,
structural confirmation might also be called “extended” or “generalized d-
confirmation.” Moreover, structural confirmation is a probabilistic expli-
cation of Salmon’s idea of confirmation by “partial entailment,” according
to which an even outcome of a throw with a fair die typically is partially
implied by a high outcome.  For this reason we might call nondeductive9
cases of structural confirmation also cases of “partial d-confirmation.”
It is important to note that the m-function leads in many cases to ‘m-
zero’ hypotheses.  For instance, every universal generalization “for all x10
Fx” gets zero m-value for an infinite universe. As we may conclude from
the general exposition, such hypotheses may well be structurally confirmed
by some evidence, by definition, according to the success criterion, but not
according to the standard criterion. For example, a black raven structurally
confirms “all ravens are black” according to the success criterion, even if
the universe is supposed to be infinite. Typical for the m-function is that it
lacks the property, which I will present as characteristic for inductive
probability functions.
1.1.2.2. Inductive Confirmation
Inductive confirmation is (pace Popper and Miller’s 1983 paper )11
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explicated in terms of confirmation based on an inductive probability
function, i.e., a probability function p having the general feature of
“positive relevance,” “inductive confirmation” or, as I like to call it,
instantial confirmation: p(Fb | E & Fa) > p(Fb | E), where ‘a’ and ‘b’ repre-
sent distinct individuals, ‘F’ an arbitrary monadic property and ‘E’ any kind
of contingent or tautological evidence. Note that this definition is easy to gen-
eralize to n-tuples and n-ary properties, but I will restrict the attention to
monadic ones. Since the m-function satisfies the condition m(Fb | E & Fa) =
m(Fb | E), we get for any inductive probability function p:
p(Fa & Fb | E) = p(Fa | E) . p(Fb | E & Fa) > m(Fa & Fb | E)
as long as we may also assume that
p(Fa | E) = p(Fb | E) = m(Fa | E) = m(Fb | E).
Inductive (probability) functions can be obtained in two ways, which may
also be combined. They can be based on:
• “inductive priors.” i.e., positive prior values p(H) for m-zero
hypotheses
and/or on 
• “inductive likelihoods,” i.e., likelihood functions p(E | H) having
the property of instantial confirmation 
Note first that forward confirmation of m-zero hypotheses requires
inductive priors, whereas backward confirmation of such hypotheses is al-
ways possible, assuming that p(E | H) can be interpreted. Second, although
we now have a definition of inductive probability functions, we do not yet
have a general definition of inductive confirmation. In the next subsection
I will give such a general definition in terms of degrees of confirmation, but
the basic idea is, of course, that the confirmation is (at least partially) due
to instantial confirmation.
With reference to the two origins of (the defining property of) inductive
probability functions I now can characterize the four main theories of con-
firmation in philosophy of science:





TABLE 1: The Four Main Theories of Confirmation in Philosophy of Science.
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Popper rejected both kinds of inductive confirmation, roughly, for three
reasons: two problematic ones and a defensible one. The first problematic
reason to note (although not convincingly presented) is that p(H) could not be
positive.  The best positive argument against zero prior probabilities is perhaps12
that zero priors amount to dogmatic scepticism with respect to the relevant
hypotheses.  The second problematic argument against inductive confirmation13
is that any probability function has the property ‘p(E ® H | E) < p(E ® H)’.14
Although the claimed property is undisputed, the argument that a proper
inductive probability function should have the reverse property, since ‘E ®
H’ is the “inductive conjunct” in the equivalence ‘H «  (E  H) & (E ®
H)’, is not convincing. The indicated reverse property may well be
conceived as an unlucky first attempt to explicate the core of (probabilistic)
inductive intuitions, which should be replaced by the property of instantial
confirmation. The defensible reason is that the latter property merely
reflects a subjective attitude and, usually, not an objective feature of the
underlying probability process, if there is such a process at all. 
Carnap, following Laplace, favored inductive likelihoods, although he
did not reject inductive priors. The so-called Bayesian approach in
philosophy of science reflects inductive priors.  Finally, Hintikka15
introduced “double inductive” probability functions, by combining the
Carnapian and the Bayesian approach. This leads to “double inductive
confirmation,” which might well be called “Hintikka-confirmation.”16
Hintikka (in his “Comment on Theo Kuipers”) likes to stress that his
approach is not only deviating technically from Carnap and  Bayes, but also
philosophically, and I agree with the main points. First, in contrast to
Carnap, Hintikka does not believe that a convincing logical argument can
be given for the choice of the relevant parameters, i.e., nonlogical criteria
dealing with subjective attitudes, such as caution, or expectations (e.g.,
about the order in the universe) are unavoidable. Second, in contrast to
Carnap and Bayes, Hintikka believes that there can be good reasons to
change the parameters, i.e., to make non-Bayesian moves, as it is sometimes
called in the literature. Finally, Hintikka’s further ambitions are to take
different kinds of information into account when dealing with confirmation
(see section 2) and to express “assumptions concerning the orderliness of
order in one’s universe of discourse . . . by explicit premises rather than [by]
choices of the value of a parameter.”  17
1.2. Degrees of Confirmation
I now turn to the problem of defining degrees of confirmation, in particular
a degree of inductive confirmation, even such that it entails a general
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definition of inductive confirmation. The present approach does not follow
the letter but is in the spirit of Mura.   The idea is to specify a measure for18
the degree of inductive influence by comparing the relevant p-expressions
with the corresponding (structural) m-expressions in an appropriate way. I
will proceed in three stages. 
1.2.1. Stage 1: Degrees of General and Structural Confirmation 
In the first stage I propose, instead of the standard difference measure
p(H | E) -  p(H), the (nonstandard version of the) ratio measure p(E | H) /
p(E) as the degree (or rate) of (backward) confirmation in general (that is,
according to some p), indicated by Cp(H, E). It amounts to the degree of
structural confirmation for p = m. This ratio has the following properties: for
p-non-zero hypotheses, it is equal to the standard ratio measure p(H | E) /
p(H), and hence is symmetric (Cp(H, E) = Cp(E, H)), but it leaves room for
confirmation (amounting to: Cp(H, E) > 1) of p-zero hypotheses. (For p-zero
evidence we might turn to the standard ratio measure.) Moreover, it satisfies
the comparative principles of deductive (d-)confirmation P1 and P2. Note
first that Cp(H, E) is equal to 1 / p(E) when H entails E, for p(E | H) = 1 in
that case. This immediately implies P2: if H and H* both entail E then
Cp(H, E) = Cp(H*, E). Moreover, if H entails E and E*, and E entails E*
(and not vice versa) then Cp(H, E) > Cp(H, E*), as soon as we may even
assume that p(E) < p(E*). This condition amounts to a slightly weakened
version of P1. In agreement with P2 we obtain, for example, that an even
outcome with a fair die equally d-confirms the hypotheses {6}, {4,6}, and
{2,4,6}, with degree of (structural and deductive) confirmation 2. This
result expresses the fact that the outcome probabilities are multiplied by 2,
raising them from 1/6 to 1/3, from 1/3 to 2/3, and from 1/2 to 1, respec-
tively. Note also that in the paradigm example of structural nondeductive
confirmation, that is, an even outcome confirms a high outcome, the
corresponding degree is (2/3) / (1/2) = 4/3. But, in agreement with P1, the
stronger outcome {4,6} confirms it more, viz., by degree (2/3) / (1/3) = 2.
It even verifies the hypothesis.
As suggested, there are a number of other degrees of confirmation.
Fitelson evaluates four of them, among which the logarithmic forward
version of our backward ratio measure, in the light of seven arguments or
conditions of adequacy as they occur in the literature.  The ratio measure19
fails in five cases. Three of them are directly related to the “pure” character
of Cp, that is, its satisfaction of P2.  In chapter 2 of From Instrumentalism20
to Constructive Realism, I defend P2 extensively. However, I also argue in
chapter 3 of that book, that as soon as one uses the probability calculus, it
does not matter very much which “confirmation language” one chooses, for
862 THEO A. F. KUIPERS
that calculus provides the crucial means for updating the plausibility of a
hypothesis in the light of evidence. Hence, the only important point which
then remains is always to make clear which confirmation language one has
chosen.
1.2.2. Stage 2: The Degree of Inductive Confirmation
In the second stage I will define, as announced, the degree of inductive
influence in this degree of confirmation, or simply the degree of inductive
(backward) confirmation (according to p), as the ratio: 
Rp(H, E) = Cp(H, E) = p(E | H) / p(E)
Cm(H, E) m(E | H) / m(E)
A nice direct consequence of this definition is that the total degree of
confirmation equals the product of the degree of structural confirmation and
the degree of inductive confirmation.
In the following table I summarize the kinds of degrees of confirmation
that I have distinguished. For later purposes I also add the log ratio version
of the ratio measure and the difference measure and, for enabling easy
comparison I mainly list the forward versions of the (log) ratio measures.
A B C D




Cp(H; E) = df
p(E | H) / p(E) =
p(H | E) / p(H) =
p(H & E) / [p(H)p(E)]
Clp(H; E) = df 
log p(E | H) / p(E) = 
log p(H | E) / p(H) = 
log p(H | E) - log p(H) 
Cdp(H; E) = df






p(H | E) = 
p(H) × Cp(H; E)
log p(H | E) =
log p(H) + Clp(H; E)
p(H | E) = 





Cm(H; E) = df
m(H | E) / m(H)
Clm(H; E) = df
log m(H | E) / m(H)
Cdm(H; E) = df





Rp(H, E) = df
[p(H | E) / p(H)] /       
     [m(H | E) / m(H)]
Rlp(H, E) = df
log [p(H | E) / p(H)] -
    log [m(H | E) / m(H)]
Rdp(H, E) = df
[p(H | E) - p(H)] -
   [m(H | E) - m(H)]
TABLE 2: Survey of Degrees of Confirmation (doc; ‘p’ fixed).
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1.2.3. Stage 3: Four Kinds of Inductive Confirmation
In the third and final stage I generally define inductive confirmation, that is,
E inductively confirms H, of course, by the condition: Rp(H, E) > 1. This def-
inition leads to four interesting possibilities for confirmation according to p.
Assume that Cp(H, E) > 1, that is, assume E confirms H according to p.
The first possibility is purely structural confirmation, that is, Rp(H, E) = 1,
in which case the confirmation has no inductive features. This trivially
holds in general for structural confirmation, but it may occasionally apply
to cases of confirmation according to some p different from m. The second
possibility is that of purely inductive confirmation, that is, Cm(H, E) = 1,
and hence Rp(H, E) = Cp(H, E). This condition typically applies in the case
of (purely) instantial confirmation, since, for example, m(Fa | Fb & E) /
m(Fa | E) = 1.
The third possibility is that of a combination of structural and inductive
confirmation: Cm(H, E) and Cp(H, E) both exceed 1, but the second more
than the first. This type of combined confirmation typically occurs when a
Carnapian inductive probability function is assigned, for example, in the
case of a die-like object of which it may not be assumed that it is fair.
Starting from equal prior probabilities for the six sides, such a function
gradually approaches the observed relative frequencies. If among the even
outcomes a high outcome has been observed more often than expected on
the basis of equal probability then (only) knowing in addition that the next
throw has resulted in an even outcome confirms the hypothesis that it is a
high outcome in two ways: structurally (as I showed already in 1.2.1) and
inductively. Consider the following example:
iLet n be the total number of throws so far, let n  indicate the number of throws
that have resulted in outcome i (1, . . . , 6). Then the Carnapian probability that
ithe next throw results in i is (n + l/6) / (n + l), for some fixed finite positive
value of the parameter l. Hence, the probability that the next throw results in
2 4 6an even outcome is (n + n + n + l/2) / (n + l), and the probability that it is
4 6‘even-and-high’ is (n + n + l/3) / (n + l). The ratio of the latter to the former
is the posterior probability of a high next outcome given that it is even and
given the previous outcomes. It is now easy to check that in order to get a
degree of confirmation larger than the structural degree, which is 4/3 as I have
noted before, this posterior probability should be larger than the corresponding
2 4 6logical probability, which is 2/3. This is the case as soon as 2n  < n  + n , that
is, when the average occurrence of ‘4’ and ‘6’ exceeds that of ‘2’.
It is easy to check that the same example when treated by a Hintikka-system
(for references, see section 1.1.2.2.) shows essentially the same combined
type of structural and inductive confirmation. 
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Let me finally turn to the fourth and perhaps most surprising possibility:
confirmation combined with the “opposite” of inductive confirmation, that
is, Rp(H, E) < 1, to be called counterinductive confirmation. Typical
examples arise in the case of deductive confirmation. In this case Rp(H, E)
reduces to m(E) / p(E), which may well be smaller than 1. A specific
example is the following: let E be Fa & Fb and let p be inductive then E d-
confirms “for all x Fx” in a counterinductive way. On second thought, the
possibility of, in particular, deductive counterinductive confirmation should
not be surprising. Inductive probability functions borrow, as it were, the
possibility of inductive confirmation by reducing the available “amount” of
possible deductive confirmation. To be precise, deductive confirmation by
some E is counterinductive as soon as E gets “inductive load” (see section
3.1) from p, that is, m(E) < p(E). 
Table 3 summarizes the distinguished kinds of confirmation: general
and deductive.
A: kind B: condition C: degree of confirmation =




Cp(H, E) > Cm(H, E) = 1 degree of inductive
 confirmation
2 Combined (inductive 
and structural) 
confirmation: 
Cp(H, E) > Cm(H, E) > 1 degree of structural
confirmation
´ degree of inductive
confirmation
3 Purely structural 
confirmation:




Cm(H, E) > Cp(H, E) > 1 degree of structural 
confirmation




H |= E, and hence
p(E|H) = m(E|H) = 1
Cp(H, E) = 1 / p(E) = 
[1/m(E)] (m(E)/p(E)) = 
Cm(H, E) Rp(H, E)
5 Purely inductive 
confirmation











TABLE 3: Survey of Kinds of Inductive Confirmation in Terms of Ratio
Degrees of Confirmation (‘p’ Fixed, ‘m’: Logical Measure Function).
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2. KINDS OF INFORMATION AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR
EXPLANATION AND GENERALIZATION
Drawing upon the work of Carnap, Bar-Hillel, Popper, Törnebohm, and
Adams, Hintikka has introduced in a systematic way two kinds of informa-
tion, indicated as surprise value and substantive information, and briefly
called information and content.  When representing them I will point out21
the close relation between transmitted information and transmitted content
on the one hand and certain degrees of confirmation on the other. Moreover,
I will characterize Hintikka’s aims and claims regarding the choice between
hypotheses when dealing with explanation and generalization in relation to
(transmitted) information and content.
2.1. Kinds of Information
2.1.1. Surprise Value Information 
The first kind of information is related to the surprise value or unexpected-
ness of a statement. As now is usual in computer science, Hintikka focuses
on the logarithmic versions of the relevant notions for their nice additive
properties. However, as in the case of confirmation, I prefer and start each
time with the nonlogarithmic versions for their conceptual simplicity. I
begin with the prior (or absolute), the posterior (or conditional) and the
transmitted notions of information. The prior information contained in a
statement, e.g., a hypothesis H, is supposed to be inversely related to its
probability in the following way:
i(H) = df 1/ p(H)
inf (H) = df log i(H) = log 1/ p(H) = - log p(H)
The posterior version aims to capture how much information this hypothe-
sis, “adds to” or “exceeds” another, e.g., an evidential statement E,
assuming E:
i(H | E) = df 1/ p(H | E) = p(E) / p(H & E) = i(H & E) / i(E)
inf (H | E)  = df - log p(H | E) = log i(H | E) = inf(H & E) - inf(E)22
Hintikka calls the inf(H | E) the incremental or conditional information.
Now I turn to the idea of information transmission: how much information
does E “convey concerning the subject matter” of H, or transmit to H,
assuming E?
trans-i(E; H) = df i(H | E) / i(H) = p(H | E) / p(H)
trans-inf(E; H)  = df inf(H) - inf(H | E) = log trans-i(H; E) = 23
log p(H | E) - log p(H)
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According to Hintikka, we may say that trans-inf(E; H) (and hence trans-
i(E; H)) “measures the reduction of our uncertainty concerning H which
takes place when we come to know, not H, but E.”24
It is directly clear that trans-i(E; H) coincides with the forward ratio
measure of confirmation Cp (H; E), and hence that it is symmetric, that is,
it equals trans-i(H; E) when p(E) and p(H) are nonzero. However, if p(H)
is 0 and p(E) nonzero, trans-i(E; H) is undefined (hence, it may be equated
with 1), but trans-i(H; E) may well be defined, viz., when p(E | H) is
defined. For instance, in case H entails E trans-i(H; E) = 1/p(E), that is, H
reduces the uncertainty regarding E from 1/p(E) to 1 (certainty). Trans-
inf (E; H) coincides of course with the logarithmic version of the ratio
measure, viz., Clp (H; E), and similar remarks apply.
2.1.2. Substantive Information 
The second kind of information is related to the content or substantive
information contained in a statement. Now there are no relevant logarithmic
versions. Again I define the prior, the posterior (or conditional) and the
transmitted notions of substantive information.
The prior content of a statement, for example, a hypothesis H, is made
inversely related to its probability by equating it with the probability of its
negation:
cont(H) = df 1 – p(H) = p(ØH)
It is called the substantive information or the content of H.
For the posterior version, called the “conditional content” by Hintikka,
aiming to capture how much information this hypothesis, “adds to” or
“exceeds” evidential statement E, assuming E, we get:
cont(H | E)  = 1 – p(H | E) = 1 – p(H & E) / p(E)25
Now I turn again to the idea of information transmission: how much
information does E convey concerning H, or transmit to H, assuming E:
trans-cont(E; H)  = df cont(H) – cont(H | E) = p(H | E) – p(H)26
According to Hintikka, we may say that trans-cont(E;H) indicates the
“change in the information-carrying status of H which takes place when one
comes to know E.”27
It is trivial to see that trans-cont(E; H) coincides with the (forward)
difference measure of confirmation. In contrast to the ratio measure (as far
as straightforwardly defined), the difference measure is not symmetric, i.e.,
p(H | E) – p(H) is in general not equal to p(E | H) – p(E). Moreover, if p(H)
is 0 and p(E) nonzero, trans-cont(E; H) is 0, that is, the “information-
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carrying status” of H does not change by coming to know E. This sounds
plausible, and so for the reverse: trans-cont(E; H) may well be substantial,
viz., when p(E | H) is defined. For instance, in case H entails E trans-
cont(H; E) = 1 - p(E) = cont(E), that is, the “information-carrying status”
of E changes by coming to know H, by cont(E).
Table 4 summarizes the notions introduced so far. I have included
Hintikka’s main characterizing terms and also the information and content
of a conjunction of two independent hypotheses. 
A B C D
1 Notion: n(.) Information: i(.) log-information: inf(.) content: cont(.)
2 Prior value: n(H) i(H) = df 1/p(H) inf(H) = df - log p(H) cont(H) = df 1 - p(H)






3 n(H & HN) for inde-
pendent H and HN,
hence, p(H & HN) = 
p(H) ´  p(HN)
i(H) ´ i(HN) inf(H) + inf(HN) cont(H & HN) =
cont(H) + cont(HN) -
cont(H) ´ cont(HN)
4 Posterior value of
H given E: n(H | E)
i(H | E) = df 
1/p(H | E) =
i(H & E) / i(E)
inf(H | E) = df 
- log p(H | E) = 
inf(H & E) - inf(E)
cont (H | E) = df 
1 - p(H/E) =





(from E to H):
trans-n(E; H)
corresponds to doc
trans-i(E; H) = df
i(H) / i(H | E) =
p(H | E) / p(H) =
Cp(H; E)
trans-inf(E; H) = df 
inf(H) - inf(H | E) = 
log p(H | E) - log p(H) =
Clp(H; E) 
trans-cont(E; H) = df
cont(H) - cont(H | E) =
p(H | E) - p(H) =
Cdp(H; E)
Hintikka the information E 
conveys concerning the
subject matter of H
the change in the con-
tent of H due to E
Transmitted value = df prior value / (resp. -) posterior value = (log) posterior 
probability / (resp. -) (log) prior probability = df degree of confirmation
TABLE 4: Survey of Definitions of “Information” and “Content” (‘p’ Fixed).
In the last row I have also included a compact indication of the plausible
relations between the various notions. For the nonlogarithmic version of
information we get more specifically:
transmitted value = df prior value / posterior value =
posterior probability / prior probability = df 
(forward) ratio degree of confirmation
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For the logarithmic version of information we get:
transmitted value = df prior value - posterior value =
log posterior probability - log prior probability = df 
log ratio degree of confirmation
Finally for the notion of content we get:
transmitted value = df prior value - posterior value =
posterior probability - prior probability = df 
difference degree of confirmation
Let me illustrate the different notions by the fair die (recall, E/H: even/high
outcome), where p = m. For the i-notions we get: 
i(E) = i(H) = 2, i(H | E) = i(E | H) = 3/2, Cm(H; E) = 
trans-i(E; H) = (2/3) / (1/2 = 4/3. 
For the inf-notions we simply get the logarithms of these values. For the
cont-notions we get: cont(E) = cont(H) = 1/2, cont(H | E) = cont(E | H) =
1/3, Cdp(H; E) = trans-cont(E;H) = 2/3 - 1/2 = 1/6.
2.1.3. Implication Related Notions
Strangely enough, Hintikka introduces as a variant of “conditional content”
cont(H | E) an alternative definition, called “incremental content,” where E
is not assumed as “posterior” condition, but only figuring as condition in
the implication E ® H, viz.,
contv(H | E)  = cont (E ®  H) = 1 – p(E ® H)28
Hintikka introduces a separate notation for “cont(E ® H),” I am puzzled
about why he does not even mention its formal analogue “inf(E ® H),” let
alone “i(E ® H)”:
iv(H | E) = df i(E ® H) = 1 / p(E ® H)
and its (logarithmic) inf-version
infv(H | E) = df inf(E ® H) = - log p(E ® H)
It is unclear why Hintikka compared, in fact, the pair “inf(H | E)” and
“cont(E ®  H),” even two times (viz., (4) and (5), (6) and (7), respectively).
The plausible comparisons seem to be both the pair “inf(E ® H)” and
“cont(E ® H)” and the pair “inf(H | E)” and “cont(H | E).” He only com-
pares the last pair (by (9) and (10)). The only reason for the first mentioned
comparison seems to be the “additive” character of both its members (as
expressed by (4) and (5)). 
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For later purposes I introduce Hintikka’s definition of the correspond-
ing transmission concept of incremental content.
trans-contv(E; H)  = df cont(H) - contvH | E) = 29
contv(H) - cont(E ® H) = 1 - p(H v E)
Similarly we can define: 
trans-infv(E; H) = df inf(H) - inf(E ® H) = log p(E ® H) / p(H)
and hence
trans-iv(E; H) = df i(H) / i(E ® H) = p(E ® H) / p(H)
Table 5 presents a survey of the implication-related notions.
A B C D
1 Notion: n(.) information: i(.) log-information: inf(.) content: cont(.)
2 Prior value: n(H) i(H) = df 1/p(H) inf(H) = df - log p(H) cont(H) = df 1 - p(H)
Hintikka the surprise value or
unexpectedness of 




3 Value of 
implication: 
(E ® H)
iv(H; E) = df 
i(E ® H) =
1/p(E ® H)
infv(H; E) = df
inf(E ® H) = 
- log p(E ® H)
contv(H; E) = df
cont(E ® H) = 
1- p(E ® H) = 
cont(H & E) - cont(E)
Hintikka incremental content
4 “Transmitted 
value by ®” 
(from E to H by 




i(H) / i(E ® H)
trans-infv(E; H) = df
inf(H) - inf(E ® H) =
log p(E ® H) / p(H)
trans-contv(E; H) = df 
cont(H) - contv(H | E) =
cont(H) - cont(E ® H) =
1 - p(H v E)
Hintikka the information E 
conveys concerning the 
subject matter of H
TABLE 5: Definitions of “Information” and “Content” Related to the
Implication (‘p’ Fixed).
2.2. Explanation and Generalization
From section 7 on, it becomes clear where Hintikka is basically aiming with
his distinction between information and content. According to him there is
a strong relation with different targets of scientific research. Let me quote
him on this matter:
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One of the most important uses that our distinctions have is to show that there
are several different ways of looking at the relation of observational data to
those hypotheses which are based on them and which perhaps are designed to
explain them. In different situations the concept of information can be brought
to bear on this relation in entirely different ways. . . . In general, the scientific
search for truth is much less of a single-goal enterprise than philosophers
usually realize, and suitable distinctions between different senses of informa-
tion perhaps serve to bring out some of the relevant differences between
different goals. 
Let us consider some differences between different cases. One of the most
important distinctions here is between, on one hand, a case in which we are
predominantly interested in a particular body of observations E which we want
to explain by means of a suitable hypothesis H, and on the other hand a case
in which we have no particular interest in our evidence E but rather want to use
it as a stepping-stone to some general theory H which is designed to apply to
other matters, too, besides E. We might label these two situations as cases of
local and global theorizing, respectively. Often the difference in question can
also be characterized as a difference between explanation and generalization,
respectively. Perhaps we can even partly characterize the difference between
the activities of (local) explanation and (global) theorizing by spelling out (as
we shall proceed to do) the differences between the two types of cases. 
It is important to realize, however, that in this respect [explanation versus
generalizing, TK] the interests of a historian are apt to differ from those of a
scientist.30
Hintikka argues at length in section 8 that in the cases where we want to
explain some evidence E by a hypothesis, we have good reasons, in his own
words (replacing symbols): “to choose the explanatory hypothesis H such
that it is maximally informative concerning the subject matter with which
E deals. Since we know the truth of E already, we are not interested in the
substantive information that H carries concerning the truth of E. What we
want to do is to find H such that the truth of E is not unexpected, given
H.”  This brings him immediately to a plea for maximizing the transmitted31
information trans-inf(E; H), which was seen to be equal to log p(E | H) /
p(E). For fixed E, this amounts, of course, to support of the so-called
maximum likelihood principle in this type of case: choose H such that p(E
| H) is maximal.
For global theorizing or generalization Hintikka argues extensively in
section 9 that we should concentrate on maximizing relevant content
notions. As a matter of fact, he has four arguments in favor of the claim that
we should choose that hypothesis that maximizes the transmitted content,
given E, that is, p(H | E) - p(H). Strangely enough, he only hints upon the
only direct argument for this by speaking of “the fourth time” that this
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expression is to be maximized, whereas he only specifies three, indirect,
arguments. However, it is clear that maximizing the transmitted content is
an argument in itself, not in the least, because it amounts to maximizing the
difference degree of confirmation. But his three indirect arguments are more
surprising, or at least two of them are. 
These three arguments are all dealing with notions of “expected value
gains.”  First he notes that the “(posterior) expected content gain,”32
plausibly defined by
p(H | E) ´ cont(H) - p(ØH | E) ´ cont(ØH)
is maximal when p(H | E) - p(E) is maximal. Then he argues that the
“expected transmitted content gain,” similarly defined by
p(H | E) ´ trans-cont(E; H) - p(ØH | E) ´ trans-cont(E; ØH) 
is also maximized by the same condition. The latter does not need to sur-
prise us very much because the “expected posterior value gain,” viz., p(H
| E) ´ cont(H | E) - p(ØH | E) ´ cont(ØH | E), is easily seen to be 0, whereas
cont(H) = trans-cont(E; H) + cont (H | E).
The third indirect argument is again surprising. It turns out that maxi-
mizing p(H | E) - p(E) also leads to maximizing the “expected transmitted
incremental content gain,” that is:
p(H | E) ´ trans-contv(E; H) - p(ØH | E) ´ trans-contv(E; ØH)
In sum, in the context of generalization, Hintikka has impressive “expecta-
tion” arguments in favor of maximizing the transmitted content.
However, I have strong doubts about his considerations. Hintikka’s plea
for maximization of the transmitted content and hence of the difference
degree of confirmation has strange consequences. Consider the case that
hypotheses H and H* have equal likelihood in view of E. Suppose, more
specifically, that H and H* entail E, and hence that p(E | H) = p(E | H*) = 1.
Then it is easy to check that maximization of p(H | E) - p(H) = p(H)(p(E | H)
/ p(E) - 1) leads to favoring the more probable hypothesis among H and H*.
This is a direct illustration of the fact that the difference measure does not
satisfy P2 (see section 1.1.1.). Its “impure” character  in the form of the33
Matthew-effect, the more probable hypothesis is rewarded more for the
same success, is, surprisingly enough, shared by Popper’s favorite measures
of corroboration.  If any preference is to be expected I would be more34
inclined to think of the reverse preference in the “context of generalization”:
if two hypotheses are equally successful with regard to the evidence, then
the stronger hypothesis seems more challenging to proceed with. Apart
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from the fact that Popper would not appreciate the notion of “generaliza-
tion,” this would be very much in Popperian spirit. On the other hand, in the
“context of explanation” one might expect a preference for the weaker
hypothesis: if one wants to explain something on the basis of the available
knowledge one will prefer, among equally successful hypotheses regarding
the evidence, the hypothesis that has the highest initial probability, that is,
to be precise, the highest updated probability just before the evidence to be
explained came available. However, this is not intended to reverse
Hintikka’s plea into a plea for maximizing likelihood in the case of
generalization, for this would, of course, not work in the case of equal
likelihoods. But a partial criterion would be possible: when the likelihoods
are the same, such as is the case for deductive confirmation, we should
favor the weaker hypothesis for explanation purposes and the stronger for
generalization purposes.  However, even this partial criterion can be35
questioned because the choice still depends very much on the used
probability function. Moreover, it is not easy to see how to proceed in the
case of different likelihoods. Simply maximizing likelihood then would
discard probability considerations that seem to be relevant at least when the
likelihoods do not discriminate.
In the next section I will start to elaborate an alternative view on
explanation and generalization, by taking structural and inductive aspects
into account. I conclude this section with a totally different critical
consideration regarding the notion of “transmitted content.” One attractive
aspect of the notion of content, whether prior or posterior, is that it has a
straightforward qualitative interpretation. If Struct(L) indicates the set of
structures of language L and Mod(H) the set of models on which H is true,
then the latter’s complement Struct(L) - Mod(H) not only represents
Mod(¬H) but is also, as Hintikka is well aware, precisely the model
theoretic interpretation of Popper’s notion of empirical content of H. Hence,
cont (H) = p(¬H) may be reconstrued as the p(Mod(¬H)) / p(Struct(L)),
where the p(Struct(L)) = 1. Similarly, cont(H | E) may be seen as the
probabilistic version of the posterior empirical content of H, viz., Mod(E) -
Mod(H). However, I did not succeed in finding a plausible qualitative
interpretation of Hintikka’s notion of transmitted content. If such an
interpretation cannot be given, it raises the question whether “transmitted
content” is more than a somewhat arbitrary notion. Note that a similar
objection would apply to the notion of “transmitted information” if it should
turn out not to be possible to give an interpretation of it in terms of
(qualitative) bits of information, of which it is well known that such an
interpretation can be given for the underlying notions of prior and posterior
information, assuming that 2 is used as the base of the logarithm. 
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3. STRUCTURAL AND INDUCTIVE ASPECTS OF EXPLANATION
AND GENERALIZATION
Whereas Hintikka tries to drive a wedge between explanation and general-
ization by the distinction between (logarithmic) information and content, in
particular the transmitted values, I would like to suggest that the distinction
between structural and inductive aspects of these and other notions is at
least as important. Hence, first I will disentangle these aspects for some
crucial notions in a similar way as I did for confirmation. Next, I will
discuss what to maximize in the service of explanation and generalization.
Since there do not seem to be in the present context (extra) advantages of
the logarithmic version of “surprise value” information, I will only deal
with the nonlogarithmic version, from which the logarithmic version can
easily be obtained if one so wishes.
3.1. Structural and Inductive Aspects of Probability and Types of Information
As we have seen in section 1.2 confirmation has structural and inductive
aspects, resulting from a comparison of the values belonging to one’s
favorite p-function, with the corresponding structural values, that is, the
values belonging to the logical measure (m-)function. I will extend this
analysis to prior and posterior probabilities and to transmitted information
and content. From now on I will call the p-function the “subjective”
probability function. However, I hasten to say that “subjective” is not
supposed to mean “merely subjective,” because such a function may well
have been designed in a rather rational way, as Carnap and Hintikka have
demonstrated very convincingly.
Let me start by defining the “inductive load” of prior and posterior
subjective probability and of the “extra inductive load” of the latter relative
to the former. There are of course two versions: a ratio and a difference
version. In table 6 I have depicted all of them.
A B: ratio loads C: difference loads
1 Prior inductive load: ni(H) p(H) / m(H) p(H) - m(H)
2 Posterior inductive load:
ni(H | E)
p(H | E) / m(H | E) p(H / E) - m(H | E)
3 Extra inductive load of 
posterior probability = 
Degree of inductive con-
firmation Rp(H; E) / Rdp
(H; E) =  Inductive load in 
transmitted i / cont
[p(H | E) / m(H | E] /
[p(H) / m(H)] = 
[p(H | E) / p(H)] / 
[m(H | E) / m(H)]
[p(H | E) - m(H | E)] -
[p(H) - m(H)] = 
[p(H | E) - p(H)] - 
[m(H | E) - m(H)]
TABLE 6: (Extra) Inductive Loads in Probabilities (‘p’ Fixed, ‘m’: Logical
Measure Function).
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It is easy to check whether the extra inductive load of the posterior
probability relative to the prior probability, as indicated in row 3, is equal
to the relevant degree of inductive confirmation as defined in section 1.2.
However, the latter degrees also equal the ratio or the difference of the
transmitted type of information to the corresponding transmitted type of
structural information. Hence, it is plausible to define them also as the
“inductive load” of the transmitted type of information. Accordingly, for the
ratio versions of loads and degrees we get the conceptual relations:
extra inductive (ratio) load (of posterior probability to the prior)
= df posterior inductive load / prior inductive load
= degree of subjective confirmation / degree of structural 
confirmation 
= df degree of inductive confirmation
= transmitted subjective information / transmitted structural
information
= df inductive load of transmitted information
And for the difference versions:
extra inductive (difference) load (of posterior probability to the
prior)
= df posterior inductive load - prior inductive load
= degree of confirmation - degree of structural confirmation
= df degree of inductive confirmation
= transmitted subjective content - transmitted structural content
= df inductive load of transmitted content
Turning to the question of how to define the (extra) inductive loads of
prior and posterior information and content, it is not immediately clear how
to proceed. For example, in the difference version it was rather plausible to
define the inductive load of the prior subjective probability by p(H) - m(H).
In view of the definition of content, 1 - p(H), it now seems plausible to
define the inductive load in the prior content by [1 - p(H)] - [1 - m(H)] =
m(H) - p(H), and hence equal to “minus the inductive load” in the prior
subjective probability. However, one might also argue for equating the
inductive (difference) loads of probability and content, or one might define
the inductive load as the absolute value | p(H) - m(H) |. Similar consider-
ations and possibilities apply to the ratio versions. However, it is not clear
whether we really need all these definitions. Let us see how far we can
come by restricting inductive aspects to the probabilities constituting
information and content and to the “corresponding” degrees of confirma-
tion, and hence to the transmitted types of information.
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3.2. Explanation and Generalization Reconsidered
In section 2.2, I discussed Hintikka’s arguments in favor of maximizing
transmitted information, and hence the (log) ratio degree of confirmation
and even the likelihood, for explanation purposes and maximizing the
transmitted content, and hence the difference degree of confirmation, for
generalization purposes. It turned out that these preferences have strange
consequences, in particular in the case of equal likelihoods, notably
deductive confirmation. Moreover, Hintikka’s perspective seemed rather
restricted by taking only one probability function into account. In my
opinion at least the subjective and the structural probability function should
be taken into account. My claim in this subsection will be that the structural
and inductive aspects may be particularly relevant when we want to
compare appropriate explanation and generalization strategies. Roughly
speaking, I will suggest that inductive features should be minimized in the
case of explanation in favor of structural features, and the reverse in the
case of generalization. 
Our leading question is: What do we want to maximize or minimize in
choosing a hypothesis, given the structural m-function and a fixed
subjective p-function, when explaining E, and when generalizing from E,
respectively? I will certainly not arrive at final answers, but only make a
start with answering these questions.  The basic candidate values for36
comparison seem to be the prior and posterior probabilities and the degree
of confirmation or, equivalently, the transmitted type of information. In all
cases we can compare subjective, structural and inductive values, and in the
case of inductive loads and degrees of confirmation we can choose at least
between ratio and difference measures. We should keep in mind that
maximizing probabilities amounts to minimizing both information and
content. In table 7 I have depicted the basic candidate values for maximiza-
tion or minimization, and indicated Hintikka’s preferences for explanation
and generalization (indicated in cells 9F and 12F, respectively) and my
tentative partial answers (1F and 2F, respectively), which are strongly
qualified in the text.
TABLE 7: (next page) Possibilities for Maximizing or Minimizing when
Choosing H, for Given p and m (p/m: Subjective/Structural Probability).




structural m(H) TK: maximize for deduc-
       tive explanation
 2 subjective p(H) TK: maximize for induc-
       tive generalization
 3 inductive
load
ratio p(H) / m(H)




structural m(H | E)
 6 subjective p(H | E)
 7 inductive 
load
ratio p(H | E) / m(H | E)




structural ratio = transmitted structural 
   information 
m(H | E) / m(H)
10 difference = transmitted structural
   content
m(H | E) - m(H)
11 subjective ratio = transmitted subjective
   information
p(H | E) / p(H) JH: maximize when
       explaining
12 difference = transmitted subjective
   content
p(H | E) - p(H) JH: maximize when
       generalizing
13 inductive ratio = extra inductive (ratio)
   load of posterior probability 
= inductive load of trans-
   mitted information
[p(H | E) / m(H | E] /
[p(H) / m(H)] =
[p(H | E) / p(H) /
[m(H | E) / m(H)]
14 difference = extra inductive (diff.)
   load of posterior probability
= inductive load of trans-
   mitted content
[p(H | E) - m(H | E)] -
[p(H) - m(H)] =
[p(H | E) - p(H)] -
[m(H | E) - m(H)]
TABLE 7: Possibilities for Maximizing or Minimizing when Choosing H, for Given p and m 
(p/m: Subjective/Structural Probability).
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Our start will be restricted to the case of equal likelihoods, more
specifically, deductive confirmation, and is particularly intended to invite
Hintikka to develop his intuitions regarding inductive aspects further. When
H and H* both entail E, all relevant likelihoods are simply 1. This result
maximizes whatever likelihood will then not work. Moreover, as I have
pointed out in section 1.2 (see table 3) deductive confirmation based on p
will be counterinductive as soon as p(E) has inductive load in the sense of
exceeding m(E). We have also seen in section 2.2 that maximizing the
transmitted subjective content, as Hintikka proposed for generalizing,
would favor, quite counterintuitively, the weaker hypothesis.  But for37
explanation purposes this might not be so counterintuitive. 
So let us first concentrate on explanation. When we merely want to
explain (deductively) a certain phenomenon on the basis of the available
knowledge, including hypotheses with various probabilities, we would like
to be safe. However, instead of saying that this explanation is based on the
difference measure of confirmation, I rather prefer to see the preference as
essentially based on the following sextuple: p(H), p(E), p(E | H), m(H),
m(E), m(E | H) , in terms of which the other notions can be defined. Hence,
my tentative answer is that in the context of deductive explanation in the
face of deductive confirmation, or more generally in the case of equal
likelihoods, the more probable hypothesis should be preferred. This is a
robust strategy as far as the comparisons of p- and m-values coincide, or are
at least not opposite, which will automatically be the case when one of the
hypotheses entails the other. However, the following are among the
interesting questions that remain.
(1) What to do when the comparison of m-values diverges from
that of p-values? 
I will deal separately with an extreme and a special case, respectively: 
(2) What to do when p(H) = p(H*) = 1 and hence, when both are
considered to be established background knowledge, and hence
when we will also have m(H) = m(H*) = 1? 
(3) What to do when the m-values of both hypotheses are 0 and the
p-values nonzero?
Regarding the first case, I would like to suggest that the hypothesis with the
highest prior m-value is the most plausible one to choose. The reason is that
the higher subjective prior probability is apparently not due to logico-
structural considerations, but due instead to inductive considerations of one
kind or another, e.g., order (simplicity, homogeneity) or analogy influences.
In the second case, the proper conclusion is that there is apparently more
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than one valid explanation available. In the third case, and more generally
when the prior m-values do not differ, our preferences may well depend on
the reason why one subjective prior probability exceeds another. The reason
may be due to the fact that one hypothesis is weaker than the other in some
logico-structural sense, which cannot be accounted for by the m-function;
this may well be the case for m-zero hypotheses. For example, “All A and
B are F” and “All C are F” may both get m-value 0, but the first claims in
a sense more than the second. In such a case, preferring the one with the
higher p-value, due to this aspect, seems plausible for explanation purposes.
However, the higher p-value may also be (mainly) due to typical inductive
considerations, whereas the relevant hypotheses are logico-structurally
comparable. As an example, the one may have more analogical features
than the other, accounted for by a higher prior subjective probability. In
such a case it will be difficult to choose. However, if the other hypothesis
is logico-structurally weaker, but not accounted for by 0 m-values, that one
seems preferable again.
Similarly interesting questions remain when I turn to the suggested
answer in the case of generalizing: in the context of (inductive) generaliza-
tion  from E by hypotheses that are deductively confirmed by E, the less38
probable hypothesis should prima facie be preferred. However, before I
discuss these questions, I have to address the so-called “converse conse-
quence property” of deductive confirmation of H by E, that is, the fact that
any stronger hypothesis than H is also deductively confirmed by E,
including any one resulting from conjugating H with a totally unrelated
additional hypothesis. Of course, we should not prefer such a type of
stronger hypothesis. As I have argued in From Instrumentalism to
Constructive Realism 2.1.2, in such a case the confirmation remains
perfectly localizable. Hence, in this case we should only compare hypothe-
ses that are relevant in a sense to be specified, where our limited knowledge
of deductive relations should ideally also be taken into account. Assuming
that such a definition can be given, the suggestion is that the less probable
of the relevant hypotheses should be preferred. Preference here of course
means preference for further testing and evaluation, not yet for acceptance,
even if that is only for the time being. 
Let me now turn to the three remaining questions or cases applied to
relevant hypotheses in the context of generalization. Regarding (1), what to
do when the p-comparison differs from the m-comparison, I would now like
to suggest that the hypothesis with the lowest prior p-value is the most
plausible one to choose. The reason is the mirror image of the one in the
case of explanation. The lower subjective prior probability is apparently not
due to logico-structural considerations but to inductive considerations in
CONFIRMATION, INFORMATION, AND CONTENT 879
favor of other hypotheses; after all, assigning higher probabilities to some
hypotheses on the basis of order or analogy considerations has to be paid by
other hypotheses. In case (2), the “hypotheses” in question will not be
considered as interesting new generalizations because they belong already
to the background knowledge. In case (3), when both prior m-values are 0,
and more generally when the prior m-values do not differ, our preferences
will again depend on the reason why one subjective prior probability
exceeds another. It may be due to the fact that the one hypothesis is weaker
in some logico-structural sense, which cannot be accounted for by the m-
function. In such a case, focussing on the one with the lower p-value, due
to this way of being stronger, seems plausible for generalization purposes.
However, the lower p-value may also be (mainly) due to typical inductive
considerations, working positive for other hypotheses. If another hypothesis
is logico-structurally stronger, but is not accounted for by 0 m-values, that
one seems now preferable to proceed with.
In sum, as far as choosing between different deductive explanations of
new evidence is concerned, my preference goes in the direction of higher
structural prior probabilities, with a number of qualifications. On the other
hand, as far as choosing between different inductive generalizations is
concerned, my preference goes in the direction of lower subjective prior
probabilities, with even more qualifications. In both cases the relevant
degrees of confirmation and hence the transmitted information do not differ,
for the corresponding likelihoods do not differ. I leave the question of how
to deal with cases of different likelihoods open.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
From sections 2 and 3 it is rather clear that we are far from a final answer
to the question how to use probabilities, and measures of confirmation,
information and content in the contexts of explanation and generalization.
However, I hope to have convinced the reader, and in particular Jaakko
Hintikka, whatever the role of different kinds of information, structural and
inductive aspects should also play a role. I conclude this paper by enlarging
the problem of choices to be made.
It is surprising that Hintikka did not explicitly consider the information-
theoretic notion of entropy, although he took the corresponding logarithmic
notion of information extensively into account. Entropy not only naturally
leads to new preference criteria between different hypotheses, but it also
suggests preference criteria between different probability functions for the
same set of (mutually exclusive and together exhaustive) hypotheses. 
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Let me start with the first. The prior entropy is defined as the prior
expected prior (logarithmic) information:
- p(H)log p(H) - p(ØH)log p(ØH)
Similarly, the posterior entropy is defined as the posterior expected
posterior information:
- p(H | E)log p(H | E) - p(ØH | E)log p(ØH | E)
It is plausible to call the difference of the prior entropy minus the posterior
entropy, the (amount of) entropy reduction due to E. Since entropy
measures something like the amount of disorder a hypothesis represents,
one plausible option could be to favor the hypothesis that obtains the
highest entropy reduction from E. However, I do not have strong feelings
in this respect. 
So let me turn to the alternative use. Assuming a finite number of
mutually exclusive and together exhaustive hypotheses H1, . . . , Hn ({H,
ØH} forms such a set above), the corresponding prior entropy is of course
iå  - p(Hi) log p(Hi)
with similar definitions for the posterior entropy and the entropy reduction.
From this perspective the natural question is of course which probability
function leads to the highest or lowest prior or posterior entropy and which
one to the highest entropy reduction. In fact, the so-called maximum
entropy principle, advocated in particular by E. T. Jaynes,  is frequently39
used for selecting the prior distribution with the highest entropy. However,
if one is willing to consider non-Bayesian moves, one may of course also
consider, in addition, to posteriorily prefer the probability distribution that
received the highest entropy reduction. 
However this may be, in my opinion, entropy considerations of one
kind or another might well turn out to be crucial for finding a satisfactory
account of preferences regarding confirmation, information, and content in
both the context of explanation and of generalization. That these contexts
have to be distinguished carefully I consider to be one of the main
challenging and even revolutionary points in Hintikka’s contribution to the
year 1968.
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